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Abstract 
To examine the effect of the variance of consumer ratings on product pricing and sales 
we develop a model which considers goods that are characterized by two types of 
attributes: experience attributes and experience attributes that were transformed in 
search attributes by consumer ratings that we call informed search attributes. For pure 
informed search goods, we find that with increasing variance optimal price increases and 
demand decreases. For pure experience goods, we find that with increasing variance 
optimal price and demand decrease. For hybrid goods, when there is low total variance 
and the average rating and total variance are held constant, optimal price and demand 
increase with increasing relative share of variance caused by informed search attributes. 
Via this mechanism, risk averse consumers may prefer higher priced goods with a higher 
variance. In addition, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the empirically 
observed j-shaped distribution of consumer ratings. 
Keywords:  Consumer Rating, Variance, Experience Attribute, Informed Search 
Attribute, E-Commerce 
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Introduction 
When a new product is introduced on the market, potential consumers have uncertainty about the product’s 
attributes, even though knowing these attributes may be important to make a decision on buying or not 
buying the product (Shapiro 1983). Nelson (1970) was the first to introduce the distinction between search 
goods and experience goods into the literature. Search goods such as printing paper or blank CDs are solely 
characterized by search attributes that can be determined by inspection without the necessity of use 
(Shapiro 1983). Experience goods such as digitalized books, music, or movies are solely characterized by 
experience attributes that can only be determined through use (Wei and Nault 2013). Nelson (1981) 
generalized this dichotomous distinction and suggested that most of the products can be described by a 
collection of search and experience attributes. 
In the pre-Internet and pre-Web 2.0 times, experience attributes could not be determined before buying a 
product and experiencing it. This has fundamentally changed in recent years due to consumer ratings on 
electronic commerce platforms which are most commonly provided in the form of a star rating system 
(indicating the valence of the consumer rating) and an optional textual review. Accordingly we consider a 
consumer rating as a combination of a quantitative rating (e.g. a star rating) and a qualitative rating (e.g. a 
textual review that explains the star rating). Researchers have referred to such consumer ratings also as 
electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) (see, e.g., Dellarocas 2003, Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004, Cheung and 
Thadani 2012). In particular, consumer ratings offer a form of peer learning among consumers by enabling 
prospective consumers to learn from other consumers’ experiences (Liu et al. 2014). Thereby, they 
transform many former experience attributes of a product into search attributes (Hong et al. 2012) and thus 
reduce the uncertainty of consumers (Chen and Xie 2008, Kwark et al. 2014). We denote these attributes 
as informed search attributes. An example for an informed search attribute is the sound quality of a 
headphone. Without additional information, assessing this attribute requires listening to the actual device 
(experience attribute). This can now be inferred from reading other consumer ratings (informed search 
attribute). Not surprisingly, 90% of purchasing decisions are influenced by consumer ratings (Drewnicki 
2013), 64% of consumers prefer sites with consumer ratings when shopping online (Kee 2008) and the 
most popular feature of Amazon.com is its consumer ratings (New York Times 2004). This makes online 
consumer ratings one of the main sources to reduce uncertainty for potential consumers.  
Not all experience attributes, however, can be transformed into informed search attributes. These are 
quality attributes that may differ between two instances of the same good. For example, negative textual 
reviews for specific headphones (Amazon 2015) show that some of the headphones technically fail after a 
relatively short period of usage. From these reviews, consumers can make some inference, i.e. learn about 
the probability of failure. What they cannot infer from these reviews is whether their individual headphones 
will fail. Thus, the failure rate represents an informed search attribute but the failure itself represents an 
experience attribute that cannot be transformed into a search attribute by consumer ratings. 
The three types of attributes we consider in this paper are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Different Types of Product Attributes 
Attribute Definition Example 
Search attributes 
Attributes that can be determined by 
consumers through reading the 
product specifications provided by 
the manufacturer. 
Color of headphones (e.g., using 
the Pantone Matching System) 
Noise Cancelling (yes/no) 
Informed search attributes 
Attributes that can be determined by 
consumers through consumer 
ratings. 
Sound quality of headphones 
Failure rate of headphones 
Experience attributes 
Quality attributes that may differ 
between two instances of the same 
good 
Technical failure of headphones 
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Much of the information contained in the textual reviews is summarized in the star rating ranging from one 
(lowest recommendation) to five (highest recommendation) on most e-commerce websites. A bar chart 
shows the distribution of the star rating, with the average rating displayed prominently beneath the product 
name. Consumers can thus see at a glance how other consumers rated the product on average and the extent 
to which opinions about the product differ (variance).  
Among the significant literature that has recently emerged on consumer ratings, several studies find that 
the absolute number and the average consumer ratings positively affect consumer demand. However, only 
few studies explicitly analyze the effect of the variance of online consumer ratings on price of the product 
and demand (Clemons et al. 2006, Hong et al. 2012, Sun 2012) and, to the best of our knowledge, none 
explicitly considers the potential effect depending on whether the variance is caused mainly by informed 
search attributes (i.e., the sound quality of headphones) or by experience attributes (i.e., the technical 
failure of headphones) or by both. 
We consider hybrid goods where variance in consumer ratings can be caused by an informed search 
attribute and an experience attribute in order to answer the following research question: How does the 
variance of consumer ratings caused by informed search and experience attributes affect product price 
and demand? 
To determine the effect of the different sources of variance of consumer ratings on product price and 
consumer demand we construct an analytical model featuring a monopoly retailer and consumers that 
differ in taste and risk aversion. We analyze three product types: pure informed search goods where the 
variance of consumer ratings is solely caused by an informed search attribute; pure experience goods where 
the variance of consumer ratings is solely caused by an experience attribute; and hybrid goods where the 
variance of consumer ratings is caused by an informed search and an experience attribute.  
Our analysis yields the following main results: First, a higher variance caused by an informed search 
attribute always signals that a product is liked by some consumers but disliked by others, and results in a 
higher equilibrium price and lower equilibrium demand. Second, a higher variance caused by an experience 
attribute signals that there is some risk associated with buying the product resulting in a lower equilibrium 
price and demand. Third, holding the average rating as well as the total variance of ratings constant and 
increasing the relative share of variance caused by the informed search attribute leads to an increase in both 
the equilibrium price and the demand for products with low total variance. Through this mechanism, 
equilibrium price and demand can increase with an increasing total variance of product ratings. We 
demonstrate, therefore, how risk averse consumers may prefer a more expensive product with a higher 
variance of ratings when deciding between two similar products with the same average rating. Finally, our 
analytical model provides a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed j-shaped distribution (Hu 
et al. 2007, Hu et al. 2009) of consumer ratings in electronic commerce. 
Related Literature 
A substantial fraction of the related literature on the effects of consumer ratings on product sales empirically 
analyzes the effect of average product ratings (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Sun 2012, Li and Hitt 
2008, Luca 2011) and the number of product ratings (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Dellarocas et al. 
2007, Duan et al. 2008) on sales of products from different product categories. Some authors have found 
that an increase in the average ratings has a positive effect on the sales of books (Chevalier and Mayzlin 
2006, Sun 2012, and Li and Hitt 2008), restaurants (Luca 2011), and movies (Dellarocas et al. 2007), 
whereas others fail to find such an effect both for books (Chen et al. 2004) and for movies (Duan et al. 
2008). For the total number of ratings, Chen et al. (2004), Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Duan et al. (2008) 
and Sun (2012) find a positive effect on sales, whereas Godes and Mayzlin (2003) do not find any such 
effect. A comprehensive review of research on online consumer ratings can be found in Trenz and Berger 
(2013). 
Only few studies have analyzed the effect of the variance of consumer ratings on product sales. In an 
empirical study focusing on the craft beer industry, Clemons et al. (2006) analyze the effect of consumer 
ratings on product demand in a market with hyperdifferentiation. Hyperdifferentiation describes 
drastically increased product variety even in very small markets. In such markets, firms are able to offer 
products which perfectly match the preferences of very small consumer segments. Thus, for products in 
hyperdifferentiated markets a good average rating is far less important than a small number of very good 
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ratings from consumers with a perfectly matched taste for the product. Further, the authors find that the 
variance of product ratings is associated with higher growth in sales in hyperdifferentiated markets. Sun 
(2012) builds a simple game-theoretical model to analyze the informational role of the variance of product 
ratings on equilibrium product price and consumer demand. Consumers in this model are risk neutral and 
all products can be described with two variables: Product quality and mismatch costs. Products with a high 
mismatch cost are products for which only some consumers have a strong liking while others substantially 
dislike it, whereas products with a low mismatch cost are products which appeal to a broad audience. In 
Sun’s model, a high average rating indicates a high product quality, whereas a high variance of ratings is 
associated with a high mismatch cost. The variance of ratings can help consumers to figure out whether a 
product’s average rating is low because of its low product quality or because of its high mismatch cost. In 
case of a low rating due to a high mismatch cost some consumers will still buy the product because they 
know that the product matches their taste and that they therefore will not incur any mismatch cost. Thus, 
a higher variance can increase the demand for a product. Sun empirically tests the theoretical predictions 
from her model using data for books sold on amazon.com and barnesandnobel.com. In line with her 
theoretical predictions she finds a positive effect of the variance of consumer ratings for books with a low 
average rating. The first study that considers different sources of the variance of consumer ratings is Hong 
et al. (2012). Using the dynamics of online consumer rating variance the authors propose an analytical 
mechanism for classifying products according to whether they have more search attributes or more 
experience attributes. By providing empirical evidence for the fact that different sources of variance lead do 
different realizations of variance over time, they build an important foundation for our analysis. Hong et al. 
(2012), however, do not analyze the relationship between different sources of variance and their effect on 
product pricing and sales.  
Our paper builds on the results from Clemons et al. (2006), Sun (2012), and Hong et al. (2012). Analyzing 
the effect of variance of consumer ratings on product pricing and consumer demand for products with an 
informed search attribute and an experience attribute, we explicitly consider whether these different 
sources of variance differently affect market outcomes. Indeed, our results indicate that the relative 
proportion of the different sources of variance serves as a valuable indicator for analyzing the effect of 
consumer ratings on product pricing and on consumer demand. 
Notation and Assumptions 
Our assumptions appertain to a number of different factors relating to, first, consumer heterogeneity, 
second, product characteristics and third, consumer ratings. These are presented in turn. 
ASSUMPTION 1 (Consumer Heterogeneity). Consumers differ in their taste and risk aversion, and 
taste and risk aversion are independent. 
In line with Sun (2012), we assume that consumers are heterogeneous in their taste for specific product 
aspects. We represent consumer taste by ߬ which is equally distributed between zero and one, i.e. ߬~ܷሾ0,1ሿ 
where zero is a perfectly matched taste. We further assume that consumers are risk averse. This assumption 
is justified by results from laboratory experiments (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002) as well as from surveys 
among online shoppers (e.g., Bhatnagar et al. 2000). Intuitively, this risk aversion is not homogeneous 
among all consumers. We denote increasing consumer risk aversion by the variable ߠ which is also equally 
distributed between zero and one, i.e. ߠ~ܷሾ0,1ሿ. Accordingly, we have a horizontally differentiated model 
along the two dimensions taste and risk aversion of consumers. Formally, consumers’ tastes and their risk 
aversions are represented by a square with edge length 1 (see figure 1) where the line segment [AB] 
represents consumer taste and the line segment [AC] represents consumer risk aversion. In each period of 
the game, a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed within this square which means that taste and 
risk aversion are independent. To keep the analysis simple, there is no overlap in consumers across periods 
(i.e., a consumer is either among first period- or second-period consumers and, thus, consumers may not 
exhibit strategic behavior). A consumer’s taste is equal to her position on the taste-axis and her risk aversion 
is equal to her position on the risk aversion-axis. For example, a consumer located in A has zero risk 
aversion and a perfect taste for the product, whereas a consumer located in E is substantially risk averse 
and has a slightly incongruous taste for the product. 
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Figure 1.  Consumer Taste and Risk Aversion 
 
ASSUMPTION 2 (Product Characteristics). Each product is characterized by a positive matched 
quality, positive or zero mismatch costs, and a failure rate between zero and one. 
We denote matched quality as v and assume that ݒ ∈ ܴା . Matched quality determines how much a 
consumer enjoys an ideal product (i.e., a product with a perfectly matched taste) that does not fail during 
its typical period of usage. Product attributes that are related to the matched quality include, for example, 
plot coherence for novels, distortion and image noise for digital cameras, or computing speed for notebooks. 
Mismatch costs are the same as in Sun (2012) and capture “aspects of the product that would have an 
influence on how much consumers would differ in their enjoyment of the product”. We denote increasing 
mismatch costs as x and assume that ݔ ∈ ሾ0, ݒሿ. Mismatch costs are caused by informed search attributes 
which are perceived differently among consumers and negatively affect their enjoyment depending on their 
taste. For example, irrespective of plot coherence, some consumers may love vampire romance stories while 
others dislike this genre. Products with informed search attributes that cause mismatch costs of close to 
zero are a perfect fit for all consumers (i.e., typical mass market products) while products with informed 
search attributes that cause high mismatch costs are a perfect fit for just a small group of people (i.e., typical 
niche products). In contrast to Sun (2012), we assume mismatch costs to be never higher than the matched 
quality of a product. Thus, even consumers who maximally dislike all informed search attributes that cause 
mismatch costs get a positive or zero enjoyment from the product if they were to obtain the product for free. 
Finally, we consider the technical quality of a product by the product’s failure rate f  [0,1] that accounts 
for the likelihood of technical product failure during the typical time of usage (Bardey 2004). While a 
product with a failure rate of zero never fails during its typical life expectancy, products with a failure rate 
of one always fail during this period. Thus, we represent the technical quality of a product by the failure rate 
which represents an informed search attribute. The actual technical failure of a product instance is Bernoulli 
distributed and represents an experience attribute. Thus, product instances are vertically differentiated by 
their technical failure. 
In the early launch stage of a product, communicated product specifications from the product manufacturer 
provides the dominant source of product information (Manchanda et al. 2008). These specifications 
primarily affect first-period consumer’s purchase decision through the elimination of uncertainty about 
search attributes (Narayanan et al. 2005) and to build expectations about informed search attributes 
resulting in expected matched quality ݒ௘, expected mismatch costs ݔ௘, and expected failure rate ௘݂. As we 
do not consider screening mechanisms or reputational effects of the producer of the product, we do not 
assume any relationship between v, x, and f.  
ASSUMPTION 3. (Consumer Rating Behavior). All first-period consumers publish honest consumer 
ratings which eliminate uncertainty about informed search attributes of the product. 
Since the 1960s marketing researchers reported that the early adopters of a new product are very keen to 
talk about the product. For example, Engel et al. (1969) write that “There seems to be no question that the 
first users of a new product or service are active in the word-of-mouth channel”. Consistent with Sun 
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(2012), we suppose that soon after a product launch all first-period consumers publish a consumer rating. 
Further, consumer ratings are honest and there is no external manipulation of consumer ratings as 
discussed in Mayzlin (2006) and Luca (2011). Assumption 3 implies that consumer ratings correspond to 
the actual utility u derived from its consumption. Consequently, consumer ratings are continuous in our 
model. The typically provided star rating systems on electronic commerce platforms represent a 
discretization of our model.  
We further assume that uncertainty about informed search attributes can be eliminated through consumer 
ratings. From a practical perspective, this seems to be a heroic assumption. However, we can make that 
assumption without loss of generality as long as it can be taken for granted that the uncertainty about 
informed search attributes are reduced by consumer ratings. Once, a critical mass of consumer ratings are 
provided on an electronic platform concerning a specific product, this will most likely be the case. 
These notations and assumptions are very similar to the model setup of Sun (2012) and overlap with the 
model assumptions of Kwark et al. (2014). Our model setup is also related to Wattal et al. (2009), who 
develop a game-theoretic model to examine how information personalization by firms interacts with 
horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Further, our model is similar in some aspects to Gu and Xie 
(2012) who examine firms’ strategic decisions regarding whether to engage in marketing activities to assist 
consumers in finding the fit between their personal tastes and products’ horizontal attributes. Finally, in 
terms of the vertical differentiation, our model is similar to (Bardey 2004) who does not treat the quality of 
the products as a known variable, but interprets the quality issue as a “survival probability” which is 
equivalent to our “failure rate”. 
Model Analysis 
We consider a two period game with a monopoly retailer and consumers with heterogeneous tastes and risk 
aversions. The structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Model Structure 
 
If a consumer with taste τ and risk aversion θ buys the product in the first period at price ଵܲ, then her 
expected utility is 
ݑଵ ൌ ሺݒ௘ െ ݔ௘߬ሻሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ. (1) 
1. Product is launched and the retailer sets a profit maximizing 
first-period price for the product based on its expectations 
about product characteristics
2. First-period consumers decide whether to purchase based on 
the first-period price and their expectations about product 
characteristics
3. First-period consumers post honest ratings of the product on 
the retailers website
4. Retailer observes consumer ratings and sets profit maximizing 
price for second-period consumers
5. Second-period consumers observe consumer ratings and 
second-period price set by the retailer and decide whether to 
buy the product
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The first part of equation (1) is equal to the expected utility of a risk neutral consumer. The last part of this 
equation captures a consumer’s negative utility caused by risk aversion due to potential product failure. To 
allow for different absolute levels of consumer risk aversion for different products, we multiply θ by a scaling 
factor ݖ ∈ ܴା. Note that our modelling of consumer risk aversion does not make any assumptions about the 
specific type of risk aversion. Our only assumption is that consumers do not like the possibility of their 
product failing. Consumers buy the product if their expected utility from consumption is greater than zero, 
and do not buy otherwise. Please note the similarities between our model and models with horizontal and 
vertcial product differentiation (see, e.g., Wattal et al. 2009 , Grilo and Wauthy 2000).  
In the first period of the game, a unit mass of first-period consumers enter the market. Each consumer has 
a maximum demand of one unit of the product and receives a utility of zero when not buying the product. 
The retailer sets price P1 based on a profit maximization calculus and consumers decide whether to buy a 
unit of the product based on their expected utility. For a consumer who buys a product of realized matched 
quality ݒ௥ and with realized mismatch cost ݔ௥, at price P1 the utility is ݒ௥ െ ݔ௥߬	 െ ଵܲ if the product does not 
fail and െ ଵܲ otherwise. After learning the realizations of ݒ௥, ݔ௥, and ௥݂ each consumer publishes an honest 
rating ݒ௥ െ ݔ௥߬	for the product if it does not fail or a rating of zero if the product fails. In the second period, 
a unit mass of second-period consumers enter the market. Second-period consumers and the retailer 
observe the mean and the variance of the rating distribution. Based on this information, the retailer sets 
price P2 based on a profit maximization calculus and second-period consumers decide whether to buy a unit 
of the product. 
In the following, we discuss three types of products: pure informed search goods, pure experience goods 
and hybrid goods. The failure rate for pure informed search goods is zero. Thus, for these products, 
consumer valuation is only determined by their expectations on matched quality ݒ௘ and mismatch costs ݔ௘. 
For pure experience goods, the mismatch costs are equal to zero. Accordingly, consumer valuation of these 
products is determined by their expectations on matched quality ݒ௘  and product failure ௘݂ . For hybrid 
goods, consumer valuation depends on their expectations on all three product attributes: matched quality, 
mismatch cost, and product failure. Depending on the product type, the expected utility for first-period 
consumers simplifies to 
ݑଵ ൌ ቐ
ݒ௘ െ ݔ௘߬ െ ଵܲ 																													
ݒ௘ሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ													
ሺݒ௘ െ ݔ௘߬ሻሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ
 
for informed search goods, 
for experience goods, 
for hybrid goods. 
(2)  
Pure Informed Search Goods 
In a first step we analyze pure informed search goods i.e., products with ݂	 ൌ 	0. For these products, the 
variance of the rating distribution is solely caused by the informed search attribute. First-period consumers 
make their purchase decisions based on expected matched quality ݒ௘ and expected mismatch costs ݔ௘. After 
the retailer chooses price P1, the expected utility of a frist-period consumer is equal to ݒ௘ – ݔ௘τ – P1. Solving 
ݒ௘ – ݔ௘τ – P1 = 0 for τ yields the taste of the indifferent consumer which we denote with ߬̃ଵ ൌ 	 ௩೐ି௉భ௫೐ . All first-
period consumers with ߬	 ൑ ߬̃ଵ  buy the product, while all consumers with ߬ ൐ ߬̃ଵ  do not. As τ is equally 
distributed between zero and one and there is a unit mass of potential consumers, first-period demand D1 
is equal to ߬̃ଵ . Consumers who purchase the product publish an honest product rating based on the 
realizations of matched quality ݒ௥ and mismatch costs ݔ௥. As tastes are uniformly distributed in [0, D1], 
ratings are also uniformly distributed between [ݒ௥ – D1ݔ௥, ݒ௥]. Given the uniform distribution of ratings, the 
average rating M and the variance of ratings V can be computed, respectively, as  
ܯ ൌ ݒ௥ െ 0.5ܦଵݔ௥, and ܸ ൌ ஽భ
మ௫ೝమ
ଵଶ . (3) 
By considering the average and the variance of ratings, second-period consumers can derive the product 
characteristics from the rating distribution. For example, a mediocre average rating and a low variance of 
ratings refers to a mediocre matched quality and low mismatch costs while a mediocre average rating and 
a high variance of ratings refers to a higher matched quality and higher mismatch costs. Mathematically, 
consumers can directly derive ݒ௥ and ݔ௥ by rearranging (3): 
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ݒ௥ ൌ ܯ ൅ √3ܸ, and ݔ௥ ൌ √ଵଶ௏஽భ . (4) 
After deriving ݒ௥  and ݔ௥ , second-period consumer have no uncertainty left in the decision process. By 
observing the ratings from first-period consumers, they exactly know how much they will enjoy the product. 
Given this information, the utility of a second-period consumer is given by ݑଶ ൌ ݒ௥ െ ݔ௥߬ െ ଶܲ. Based on ݑଶ 
the retailer can derive the taste of the indifferent consumer as a function of the second-period product price 
ଶܲ: ߬̃ଶ ൌ ሺݒ௥ െ ଶܲሻ ݔ௥⁄ . As taste is uniformly distributed among consumers, the second-period demand ܦଶ	is 
also equal to ߬̃ଶ. Knowing this demand, the retailer can maximize profits by solving:	max௉మ ଶܲ ܦଶ. This leads 
to the following second-period equilibrium levels of price and demand: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ௩ೝଶ , and ܦଶ∗ ൌ
௩ೝ
ଶ௫ೝ. (5) 
In terms of M and V equilibrium price and demand can be rewritten as: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ெଶ ൅
√ଷ௏
ଶ , and ܦଶ∗ ൌ
ୈభ
ସ ሺ
୑
√ଷ୚ ൅ 1ሻ. (6) 
Based on these representations of ଶܲ∗ and ܦଶ∗, we present the effects of ܯ and ܸ on equilibrium price and 
demand for pure informed search goods in the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 1. For pure informed search goods, equilibrium price and demand both increase with the 
average rating, equilibrium price increases and equilibrium demand decreases with the variance of 
ratings. 
PROOF. Differentiating the equilibrium price and demand for pure informed search goods with respect to 
ܯ  and ܸ  gives డ௉మ∗డெ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ, 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏ ൌ
ଷ
ସ√ଷ୚, 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൌ
ୈభ
ସ√ଷ୚, and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏ ൌ െ
ଷெୈభ
଼ሺଷ୚ሻ
య
మ
. Recall that ܯ , ܸ , and ܦଵ  are positive by 
definition. Thus, we have డ௉మ
∗
డெ ൐ 0, 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏ ൐ 0, 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൐ 0, and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏ ൏ 0. Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows: First, a higher average rating is a credible signal of overall 
product quality. Intuitively the retailer charges a higher price and consumers have a higher demand for a 
product with a higher quality. The findings in the related literature on the impact of average ratings on sales 
of pure informed search goods are equivocal (see related literature). The first part of proposition 1 
represents a theoretical confirmation of the findings of Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Sun (2012), Li and 
Hitt (2008), and Dellarocas et al. (2007) who empirically found a positive impact of average consumer 
ratings on sales for pure informed search goods (books and movies). 
Second, a high variance of product ratings indicates that the mismatch cost of the product is relatively high. 
This means that consumers with the ‘right’ taste for the product enjoy the product much more than the 
average rating would suggest. The retailer charges a higher price to all consumers to skim the higher 
willingness to pay of consumers with the ‘right’ taste. This higher price always deters some consumers with 
an incongruous taste for the product. Figure 3 illustrates the response of second-period price and demand 
to changes in the average and in the variance of ratings. In contrast to Sun (2012), we do not find that a 
higher variance of ratings may also increase second-period demand. In Sun’s model, a necessary condition 
for such an effect is that the average rating M is negative. From (3), we know that a negative average rating 
means that ݔ௥ ൐ 2ݒ௥/ܦଵ. As ܦଵ has a maximum of 1 which implies that ݔ௥ ൐ 2ݒ௥. This would mean that the 
enjoyment of a consumer with a maximal unmatched taste (i.e., a consumer with ߬ ൌ 1) is at most െݒ௥ if 
ଵܲ ൌ 0. As most products will not exhibit such characteristics, our first assumption rules out the possibility 
of M being negative by assuming ݔ௥ ∈ ሾ0, ݒ௥ሿ. 
Pure Experience Goods 
In a second step, we analyze pure experience goods, i.e., products with f > 0 and x = 0. For these products, 
the variance of the rating distribution is caused entirely by the experience attribute. First-period consumers 
make their purchase decisions based on ݒ௘ and ௘݂, respectively. After the retailer chooses a price ଵܲ, the 
expected utility of a first-period consumer is ݑଵ ൌ ݒ௘ሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ. Solving ݒ௘ሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ ൌ 0 
for ߠ yields the risk aversion of an indifferent consumer which we denote by ߠ෨ଵ ൌ ௩೐ሺଵି௙೐ሻି௉భ௙೐௭ . All first-period 
consumers with ߠ	 ൑ ߠ෨ଵ	buy the product, while all consumers with ߠ ൐ ߠ෨ଵ  do not. Thus, as ߠ  is equally 
 Different Sources of the Variance of Consumer Ratings 
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 9 
distributed between zero and one and we have a unit mass of consumers, first-period demand ܦଵ is equal 
to the risk aversion of the indifferent consumer. Consumers who purchase the product publish an honest 
product rating based on the realization of matched quality ݒ௥ and whether the purchased product fails. As 
mismatch costs are zero for pure experience products, consumers publish either a rating of ݒ௥ if the product 
does not fail, or a rating of zero if the product fails. This results in ratings of first-period consumers, where 
(1 - ௥݂) percent of the ratings are ݒ௥ and ௥݂ percent are zero. For this rating distribution, the average rating 
M and the variance of ratings V can be computed, respectively, as 
ܯ ൌ ݒ௥ሺ1 െ ௥݂ሻ, and ܸ ൌ ݒ௥ଶ ௥݂ሺ1 െ ௥݂ሻ. (7) 
As for pure informed search goods, consumers need to consider both the average and the variance of ratings 
to be able to infer the product characteristics from the rating distribution. For example, a mediocre average 
rating with no variance suggests that the matched quality of the product is also mediocre while a mediocre 
rating with high variance shows that the product has a high matched quality but that a substantial fraction 
of products fail. By considering both the average and the variance of ratings, second-period consumers can 
unambiguously derive ݒ௥ and ௥݂. Mathematically, later consumers can learn about ݒ௥ and ௥݂ by rearranging 
(7): 
ݒ௥ ൌ ܯ ൅ ௏ெ, and ௥݂ ൌ
௏
ெమା௏. (8) 
After deriving ݒ௥ and ௥݂, consumers have no uncertainty about the matched quality and the failure rate of 
the product. However, even after learning about the failure rate, there is still no guarantee that an individual 
product may not fail. Thus, the expected utility for a second-period consumer is ݑଶ = ݒ௥(1 – ௥݂) – P2 – z ௥݂θ 
where the term z ௥݂θ captures consumer risk aversion with regard to product failure. Based on ݑ௥ the retailer 
can derive the risk aversion ߠ෨ଶ	of the indifferent consumer as a function of the second-period product price 
ଶܲ : ߠ෨ଶ ൌ ሺݒ௥ሺ1 െ ௥݂ሻ െ ଶܲሻ ⁄ ሺݖ ௥݂ሻ . Again, second-period demand ܦଶ  is equal to ߠ෨ଶ  and the retailer 
solves:	max௉మ ଶܲ ܦଶ resulting in the following second-period equilibrium levels of price and demand: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ௩ೝሺଵି௙ೝሻଶ , and ܦଶ∗ ൌ
௩ೝሺଵି௙ೝሻ
ଶ௙ೝ௭ . (9) 
In terms of M and V, second-period equilibrium levels of price and demand can be rewritten as: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ெଶ , and ܦଶ∗ ൌ
ெయ
ଶ௏௭ ൅
ெ
ଶ௭. (10) 
We use these representations of ଶܲ∗  and ܦଶ∗  to present the effects of ܯ  and ܸ  on equilibrium price and 
demand for pure experience goods in the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 2. For pure experience goods, equilibrium price and demand both increase with the 
average rating, equilibrium price is not affected by the variance of ratings, and equilibrium demand 
always decreases with an increasing variance of consumer ratings. 
PROOF. Differentiating the equilibrium price and demand for pure experience goods with respect to ܯ and 
ܸ gives డ௉మ∗డெ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ, 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏ ൌ 0, 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൌ
ଷெమା௏
ଶ௏௭ , and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏ ൌ െ
ெయ
ଶ୚మ௭. As ܯ, ܸ, and ݖ are positive by definition, we have 
డ௉మ∗
డெ ൐
ଵ
ଶ, 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏ ൌ 0, 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൐ 0, and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏ ൏ 0. Q.E.D.  
As with pure informed search goods, a higher average rating acts as a credible signal of higher expected 
product quality for consumers and for the retailer, and therefore increases equilibrium price and demand. 
Regarding the variance of product ratings, we find that it does not affect equilibrium price and always has 
a negative effect on equilibrium demand. The intuition for this result is as follows: First, given a constant 
average rating, a higher variance of ratings implies both a higher matched quality and a higher failure rate 
of the product so that the expected utility of a risk neutral consumer remains constant. Still, as consumers 
in our model are risk averse, their expected utility decreases with an increasing variance of product ratings. 
At the same time, the retailer of the product sets the product price as if all consumers were risk neutral 
because the additional revenue from increased sales to consumers with high risk aversion due to a lower 
price is always lower than the lost revenue from consumers with a lower risk aversion. Given that the 
equilibrium price does not depend on the variance of consumer ratings and the expected utility of risk 
averse consumers decreases with an increasing variance of product ratings, it follows naturally that the 
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equilibrium demand decreases with increasing variance of consumer ratings. Figure 4 illustrates the 
response of equilibrium price and demand to changes in the variance of product ratings. 
 
  
Figure 3.  Second-Period Price and Demand for 
Pure Informed Search Goods 
Figure 4.  Second-Period Price and Demand for 
Pure Experience Goods 
 
Hybrid Goods 
In a final step, we analyze our model for hybrid goods i.e., products with f > 0 and x > 0. For these products, 
the variance of consumer ratings depends on both the informed search and the experience attribute. First-
period consumers make their purchase decisions based on ݒ௘ , ݔ௘ , and ௘݂ , respectively. After the retailer 
chooses price P1, the expected utility of a first-period consumer is ݑଵ ൌ ሺݒ௘ െ ݔ௘߬ሻሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲ െ ௘݂ݖߠ. Given ݑଵ and the independence of taste and risk aversion, we can derive first-period demand D1. First, we need to 
derive the taste of an indifferent consumer with zero risk aversion ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴	and the risk aversion of an 
indifferent consumer given that taste is zero ߠ෨ଵఛୀ଴. As taste and risk aversion are independent, first-period 
demand is equal to the area of the triangle [A,߬ூ,ଵఏୀ଴, ݎூ,ଵఛୀ଴ ] (see figure 5 for an example) with ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ ൌ
ሺ ଵܲ ൅ ݒ௘ሺ ௘݂ െ 1ሻሻ ሺݔ௘ሺ ௘݂ െ 1ሻሻ,⁄  and ߠ෨ଵఛୀ଴ ൌ ሺݒ௘ሺ1 െ ௘݂ሻ െ ଵܲሻ ݖ ௘݂⁄ . Thus, ܦଵ ൌ 0.5߬̃ଵఏୀ଴	ߠ෨ଵఛୀ଴.  
 
 
Figure 5.  First-Period Demand for Hybrid Goods Figure 6.  Rating Distribution of Hybrid Goods 
 
Consumers who purchase the product publish an honest product rating based on the realization of matched 
quality ݒ௥, mismatch costs ݔ௥, and whether the purchased product fails. They publish a rating ݎ ൌ ݒ௥ െ ݔ௥߬ 
if the product does not fail and a rating of ݎ ൌ 0 if it does. This results in ratings of first-period consumers, 
where (1 - ௥݂) percent of the ratings are ݒ௥ െ ݔ௥߬ and ௥݂ percent are zero. For products which do not fail, 
ratings are triangularly distributed between ݒ௥ െ ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ݔ௥ and ݒ௥ with mode at ݒ௥. The explanation for this 
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specific shape of the distribution is as follows: As τ = 0 for consumers who publish a rating of ݒ௥ , the 
maximum risk aversion for these consumers is ߠ෨ଵఛୀ଴. For lower ratings the maximum risk aversion and, 
therefore, the number of consumers who publish a rating also decreases. Thus, the mode of the triangular 
distribution must be at ݒ௥ and the number of ratings strictly decreases with increasing taste. For a rating of 
ݒ௥ െ ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ݔ௥ the maximum risk aversion is zero. Thus, ݒ௥ െ ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ݔ௥ is the lower bound of the distribution of 
ratings for hybrid goods that do not fail. Such a purchasing bias (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Hu et al. 
2009) where consumers who are more likely to enjoy a product are also more likely to buy the product has 
been discussed in several previous studies (e.g., Nagle and Riedl 2014). Figure 6 illustrates the rating 
distribution for hybrid goods. This distribution has the typical j-shape which has been found for almost all 
products sold on amazon.com (Hu et al. 2007, Hu et al. 2009).  
In contrast to pure informed search goods and pure experience goods, the enjoyment of hybrid goods 
depends not only on two, but on three product characteristics. Thus, it is not sufficient to consider only the 
average and the variance of ratings to derive the relevant product characteristics from the rating 
distribution. For example, based on the average and the variance of the rating distribution alone, consumers 
cannot distinguish if a mediocre rating and a positive variance is caused by informed search attributes 
(mismatch costs), experience attribute (product failure), or a combination of the two. However, by 
decomposing the total variance into (1) variance caused by mismatch costs and (2) variance caused by 
product failure, consumers and the retailer can distinguish between these cases. Variance caused by 
mismatch costs, denoted as ௠ܸ, can be derived by disregarding all negative ratings which are caused by 
product failure and computing the variance of the remaining rating distribution, i.e., the triangle on the 
right in figure 6. As we only have two sources of variance, the variance caused by product failure, denoted 
as Vf, must be equal to the difference between the total variance and the variance caused by mismatch costs. 
Mathematically, M, Vm, and Vf can be computed, respectively, as: 
ܯ ൌ ሺݒ௥ െ ఛ෤భ
ഇసబ௫ೝ
ଷ ሻሺ1 െ ௥݂ሻ, ௠ܸ ൌ
ሺఛ෤భഇసబሻమ௫ೝమሺଵି௙ೝሻ
ଵ଼ , and ௙ܸ ൌ
ሺ ଵି௙ೝሻ௙ೝሺଷ௩ೝିఛ෤భഇసబ௫ೝሻమ
ଽ . (11) 
Based on M, Vm, and Vf consumers can derive the characteristics of the product. A product with a rating 
distribution with large M, large Vm, and small Vf suggests that the product has a high matched quality and 
substantial mismatch costs but only a small failure rate, while a product with large M, small Vm, and large 
Vf has a high matched quality with a substantial failure rate but only little mismatch costs. Mathematically, 
consumers can derive ݒ௥, ݔ௥, and ௥݂ for hybrid goods by rearranging (11): 
After deriving ݒ௥ , ݔ௥ , and ௥݂  consumers are left with no uncertainty about the product’s attributes. They 
know the exact mismatch costs of the product and, therefore, how well the product fits their tastes. 
However, even if consumers know the exact failure rate of the product, they cannot know whether their 
individual product will fail. As with pure experience products, they still need to experience their individual 
product. Thus, the expected utility for a later consumer is ݑଶ = (ݒ௥ –ݔ௥τ)(1 – ௥݂) – z ௥݂θ – P2 where the term 
z ௥݂θ still captures the risk associated with product failure. Based on the utility, the retailer can derive 
second-period demand. As in the first period, second-period demand ܦଶ is equal to 0.5߬̃ଶఏୀ଴ߠ෨ଶఛୀ଴. In terms 
of ݒ௥, ݔ௥, and ௥݂, second-period demand can be written as: 
ܦଶ ൌ ሺ௩ೝሺଵି௙ೝሻି௉మሻ
మ
ଶ௙ೝ௫ೝ௭ሺଵି௙ೝሻ . (13) 
Based on second-period demand the retailer solves max௉మ ଶܲ ܦଶ and second-period equilibrium levels of price 
and demand can be derived as: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ௩ೝሺଵି௙ೝሻଷ , ܦଶ∗ ൌ
ଶ௩ೝమሺଵି௙ೝሻ
ଽ௙௫ೝ௭ . (14) 
Using the relationship between ݒ௥, ݔ௥, and ௥݂ and M, Vm, and Vf, equilibrium levels of price and demand can 
be rewritten as functions of M, Vm, and Vf: 
ଶܲ∗ ൌ ெଷ ൅
ெටଶ௏೘൫ெమା	௏೑൯
ଷ൫ெమା	௏೑൯ 	and ܦଶ
∗ ൌ ெఛ෤భ
ഇసబටଶ൫ெమା ௏೑൯ሺඥଶ௏೘ାටெమା ௏೑ሻమ
ଶ଻௏೑ඥ௏೘௭  
(15) 
ݒ௥ ൌ ܯ ൅ ௏೑ାሺଶ௏೘൫ெ
మା	௏೑൯ሻభ మ⁄
ெ , ݔ௥ ൌ
ሺଶ௏೘൫ெమା ௏೑൯ሻయ మ⁄
ெఛ෤భഇసబ
, and ௥݂ ൌ ௏೑ெమା௏೑. (12) 
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Based on these representations of ଶܲ∗ and ܦଶ∗, we derive the effects of the average rating, variance caused by 
mismatch costs, and variance caused by product failure on equilibrium price and demand in the next four 
propositions. 
PROPOSITION 3. For hybrid goods, equilibrium price and demand increase with the average rating. 
PROOF. Differentiating and rearranging equilibrium price and demand for hybrid goods with respect to ܯ 
yields డ௉మ
∗
డெ ൌ ሺඥ2 ௠ܸ ௙ܸሻ ⁄ ሺ3ሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻଷ/ଶሻ ൅ 1/3 , and 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൌ ሺ݀߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ 27 ௙ܸݖൗ ሻሺඥ2ሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻ/ ௠ܸ	 ൅ 	2ሻሺ ௙ܸ ൅
	4ܯଶ ൅	ඥ2 ௧ܸሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻ ൅ ܯଶඥሺ2 ௠ܸሻ/ሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሻ. As ܯ, ௠ܸ , ௙ܸ , ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ , and ݖ are positive by definition, we 
have డ௉మ
∗
డெ ൐ 0, and 
డ஽మ∗
డெ ൐ 0. Q.E.D. 
As for pure informed search and pure experience goods the average rating acts as a credible signal of 
expected product quality for consumers and for the retailer. Therefore, equilibrium price and demand both 
increase with the average rating. Proposition 3 represents a theoretical confirmation of the empirical 
findings of Luca (2011) who found that the average rating of restaurants increases sales. A restaurant is a 
typical example of a hybrid good as consumer ratings on the restaurant’s atmosphere, service and food 
reduce the uncertainty of consumers. However, the service and food quality may differ between two visits 
of the same restaurant. 
PROPOSITION 4. For hybrid goods, equilibrium price increases, and equilibrium demand decreases with 
increasing variance caused by mismatch costs. 
PROOF. Differentiating the equilibrium price and demand with respect to ௠ܸ  yields 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏೘ ൌ
√2ܯ ሺ6ሺ ௠ܸሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሻଵ/ଶሻൗ , and డ஽మ
∗
డ௏೘ ൌ െሺܯ߬̃ଵ
ఏୀ଴ሺ2 ௠ܸሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሻଵ ଶ⁄ ሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸ– 	2 ௠ܸሻሻ ሺ54 ௙ܸ ௠ܸଶݖሻൗ . As ܯ, ௠ܸ , 
and ௙ܸ are positive by definition, we have 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏೘ ൐ 0. The sign of 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೘ solely depends on ൫ܯ
ଶ ൅	 ௙ܸ– 2 ௠ܸ൯ which 
is positive if ௠ܸ ൐ ெ
మ
ଶ ൅
௏೑
ଶ . From assumption 1 we have ݔ ൑ ݒ. Rewriting this inequality in terms of ܯ, ௙ܸ, 
and ௠ܸ  and simplifying leads to: ௠ܸ ൏ ఛ෤భ
ഇసబమ൫ெమା	௏೑൯
ଶ൫ఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଷ൯
మ . As ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ  this contradicts ௠ܸ ൐ ெ
మ
ଶ ൅
௏೑
ଶ . Thus, 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೘ ൏ 0. Q.E.D. 
As for pure informed search goods, a high variance of product ratings caused by mismatch costs indicates 
that the mismatch costs of the product are relatively high. Again, this means that consumers with the right 
taste for the product enjoy the product more than the average rating would suggest. Thus, the retailer 
charges a higher price to all consumers to skim the higher willingness to pay of consumers with the ‘right’ 
taste. The decrease in equilibrium demand with increasing Vm is attributable to the increasing equilibrium 
price. This price always deters some consumers with an incongruous taste for the product and, therefore, 
always results in a decreasing equilibrium demand. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between, on the one 
hand, equilibrium price and demand, and on the other, the variance caused by mismatch costs. 
PROPOSITION 5. For hybrid goods, the equilibrium price decreases with increasing variance caused by 
product failure. Equilibrium demand decreases with increasing variance caused by product failure if the 
variance caused by product failure is sufficiently low. Equilibrium demand increases in variance caused 
by product failure if the variance caused by product failure is sufficiently high and the variance caused 
by mismatch costs is sufficiently low. 
PROOF. Differentiating equilibrium demand and price with respect to ௙ܸ  gives 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೑ ൌ
െ ఛ෤భ
ഇసబሺ଼ெయ௏೘ା	ටሺଶெమ௏೘ሻሺሺெమା	௏೑ሻషభሻሺଶெరି	௏೑మା	ଶ௏೑௏೘ା	ெమ௏೑ା	ସெమ௏೘ሻሻ
ହସ௏೑మ௏೘௭
 and 	డ௉మ∗డ௏೑ ൌ െ
ெమ௏೘
ଷ൫ெమା	௏೑൯మටሺଶெమ௏೘ሻሺெమା	௏೑ሻషభ
. As ܯ, 
௠ܸ, and ௙ܸ are positive by definition, we have 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏೑ ൏ 0. The sign of 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೑ depends on the sign of the term in 
parenthesis. If this term is positive, we have డ஽మ
∗
డ௏೑ ൏ 0 and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೑ ൐ 0 if it is negative. A necessary condition that 
the term could be negative is that ௙ܸ ൐ 2ܯଶ as ሺ2ܯସ െ	 ௙ܸଶ ൅ 	2 ௙ܸ ௠ܸ ൅	ܯଶ ௙ܸ ൅ 	4ܯଶ ௠ܸሻ is always positive if 
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௙ܸ ൏ 2ܯଶ . Assuming that ௙ܸ ൐ 2ܯଶ  and solving 8ܯଷ ௠ܸ ൅	ሺሺ2ܯଶ ௠ܸሻ ሺܯଶ ൅ ௙ܸሻൗ ሻଵ/ଶሺ2ܯସ െ	 ௙ܸଶ ൅ 	2 ௙ܸ ௠ܸ ൅
	ܯଶ ௙ܸ ൅ 	4ܯଶ ௠ܸሻ ൌ 0  for ௠ܸ  gives ௠ܸ ൌ ሺሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሺെ	2ܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻଶሻ ሺ2ሺ2ܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻଶሻൗ . As 8ܯଷ ௠ܸ ൅
	ሺሺ2ܯଶ ௠ܸሻ ሺܯଶ ൅ ௙ܸሻൗ ሻଵ/ଶሺ2ܯସ െ	 ௙ܸଶ ൅ 	2 ௙ܸ ௠ܸ ൅	ܯଶ ௙ܸ ൅ 	4ܯଶ ௠ܸሻ is strictly increasing in ௠ܸ, we have డ஽మ
∗
డ௏೑ ൐
0 if ௙ܸ ൐ 2ܯଶ and ௠ܸ ൏ ሺሺܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሺെ	2ܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻଶሻ ሺ2ሺ2ܯଶ ൅	 ௙ܸሻଶሻൗ . Q.E.D.  
As for pure experience goods, a higher variance of product ratings caused by product failure indicates a 
higher failure rate of the product and the retailer sets the equilibrium product price as if all consumers were 
risk neutral. However, due to the positive mismatch costs and differently from pure experience products, 
the utility of a risk neutral consumer is slightly decreasing with increasing Vf. Thus, the equilibrium price 
always decreases if Vf increases. Increasing Vf always leads to a decrease in equilibrium demand if ௙ܸ ൏ 2ܯଶ. 
As a higher variance caused by product failure is associated with a higher failure rate of the product, 
consumers are risk averse, and the product is priced as if consumers were risk neutral, which is intuitive. If 
௙ܸ ൐ 2ܯଶ, increasing Vf leads to an increase in equilibrium demand if ௠ܸ ൏ ሺ4ܯ଺– 	3ܯଶ	 ௙ܸଶ ൅	 ௙ܸଷሻ/ሺ8ܯସ ൅
	8ܯଶ	 ௙ܸ ൅ 	2 ௙ܸଶ	ሻ. This counterintuitive finding is attributable to the necessary increase in ݒ, ݔ and ݂ caused 
by the increased variance due to product failure. Ceteris paribus, increasing Vf is associated with an 
increasing failure rate, and, due to the constant average rating, an increasing matched quality of the 
product. At the same time, a higher failure rate of the product implies that only a smaller fraction of all sold 
products do not fail and, therefore, can cause variance due to consumer taste. Thus, increasing Vf is also 
associated with an increase in x. This combination in connection with a decreasing price may, in very few 
situations, lead to an increase of equilibrium demand. We note that for ratings in a typical 5 star rating 
system with a rating of one indicating the worst and a rating of five indicating the best possible quality, it is 
never possible that ௙ܸ ൐ 2ܯଶ. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between equilibrium price and demand 
and variance caused by product failure for a product with ௙ܸ ൑ 2ܯଶ. 
 
  
Figure 7.  Equilibrium Price and Demand for 
Hybrid Goods – Mismatch Costs 
Figure 8.  Equilibrium Price and Demand for 
Hybrid Goods – Product Failure 
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PROPOSITION 6. For hybrid goods, holding the total variance constant, equilibrium price always 
increases (decreases) with an increasing relative share of variance caused by mismatch costs (product 
failure). Equilibrium demand increases (decreases) with an increasing share of variance caused by 
mismatch costs (product failure) if ܸ ൏ ܸ and decreases (increases) with an increasing share of variance 
caused by mismatch costs (product failure) if ܸ ൐ ܸ . 1  If ܸ ൑ ܸ ൑ ܸ  second-period demand increases 
(decreases) with increasing share of variance caused by mismatch costs (product failure) if this variance 
exceeds threshold ்ܸ .  
PROOF. To analyze the effect of the relative share of ௙ܸ (which is equivalent to the effect of the relative share 
of ௠ܸ ), we need to substitute ௠ܸ  by ܸ െ ௙ܸ  in (15). Differentiating the resulting equilibrium price and 
demand with respect to ௙ܸ and rearranging terms it gives 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏೑ ൌ െ
√ଶெమሺெమା	௏ሻ
଺ሺெమା	௏೑ሻమටሺெమሺ௏	–	௏೑ሻሻሺெమା	௏೑ሻషభ
, and డ஽మ
∗
డ௏೑ ൌ
√ଶெ௧ሚభೝసబ
ହସ௏೑మ௭ට൫௏ି௏೑൯
య൫ெమା	௏೑൯షభ
ሺሺܯଶ ௙ܸ ൅	 ௙ܸଶ ൅ ଶ௏೑൫௏	ି	௏೑൯
మ
ெమା	௏೑
ሻ െ ሺܸ െ ௙ܸሻሺ4ሺܸ	 െ	 ௙ܸሻ ൅ 	2ܯଶ ൅ 	4ܯଶට2 ௏ି௏೑ெమା	௏೑ ൅	 ௙ܸሻሻ . As 
௙ܸ is by definition always smaller than ܸ, we have డ௉మ
∗
డ௏೑ ൏ 0 and, vice versa, 
డ௉మ∗
డ௏೘ ൐ 0. As 
√ଶெ௧ሚభೝసబ
ହସ௏೑మ௭ට൫௏ି௏೑൯
య൫ெమା	௏೑൯షభ
 
is always positive, the sign of 
డ஽మ∗ቀெ,௏,௏೑,ఛ෤భഇసబ,௭ቁ
డ௏೑  depends only on the term: 
ሺܯଶ ௙ܸ ൅	 ௙ܸଶ ൅ ଶ௏೑൫௏	ି	௏೑൯
మ
ெమା	௏೑
ሻ െ ሺܸ െ ௙ܸሻሺ4ሺܸ െ ௙ܸሻ ൅ 2ܯଶ ൅ 4ܯଶට2 ௏ି௏೑ெమା ௏೑ ൅ ௙ܸሻ  (16) 
which is strictly increasing in ௙ܸ for ௙ܸ ∈ ሾ0, ܸሿ and strictly decreasing in ܸ. From our assumptions that ݔ ൏
ݒ and ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ ൏ 1 we get ܸ	– ఛ෤భ
ഇసబమሺெమା	௏ሻ
ଷሺఛ෤భഇసబ
మ–	ସఛ෤భഇసబ	ା	଺ሻ
൏ ௙ܸ ൏ ൫ସ௏	–	ଶெ
మ൯ఛ෤భഇసబ
మ–	ଷ଺௏ఛ෤భഇసబ	ା	଼ଵ௏
଺ఛ෤భഇసబ
మ–	ଷ଺ఛ෤భഇసబ	ା	଼ଵ
. Inserting the upper bound of ௙ܸ 
into (16) and solving ሺ16ሻ ൌ 0 for ܸ gives ܸ ൌ ܸ. Thus, if ܸ ൏ ܸ, we have డ஽మ∗డ௏೑ ൏ 0 and, vice versa 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೘ ൐ 0. 
Inserting the lower bound of ௙ܸ into (16) and solving ሺ16ሻ ൌ 0 for ܸ gives ܸ. Thus, if ܸ ൐ 	ܸ, we have డ஽మ
∗
డ௏೑ ൐
0, and, vice versa డ஽మ∗డ௏೘ ൏ 0. If ܸ ൒ ܸ and ܸ ൑ 	ܸ, the sign of (16) depends on the specific value of ௙ܸ. As (16) 
is strictly increasing with increasing ௙ܸ, and (16) is neither always positive nor always negative there is some 
threshold ்ܸ  where డ஽మ∗డ௏೑ ൏ 0, and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೘ ൐ 0 if ௙ܸ ൏ ்ܸ  and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೑ ൐ 0, and 
డ஽మ∗
డ௏೘ ൏ 0 if ௙ܸ ൐ ்ܸ . Q.E.D. 
The intuition for this result is as follows: A larger relative share of variance caused by the informed search 
attribute is necessarily associated with a smaller relative share of variance caused by product failure. 
Holding the total variance constant, this means that the variance caused by mismatch costs increases and 
the variance caused by product failure decreases by the same amount. Again, the increased variance caused 
by mismatch costs indicates that some consumers value the product even more than the average rating 
would suggest. Based on this information, the retailer increases the product price to take advantage of these 
consumers' higher willingness to pay. At the same time, the decreased Vf indicates both a lower matched 
quality and a lower failure rate of the product. This leads to a further increase of the equilibrium price as 
the utility of a risk neutral consumer increases with decreasing Vf for hybrid goods.  
Holding the average rating constant, a lower matched quality and a lower failure rate of the product makes 
the product more attractive to risk averse consumers. This increase overcompensates for the decrease in 
second-period equilibrium demand due to the increased product price discussed in the paragraph above if 
ܸ ൏ ܸ or ܸ ൒ ܸ and ௙ܸ ൏ ்ܸ . If ܸ ൐ ܸ or ܸ ൒ ܸ and ௙ܸ ൐ ்ܸ , the positive effect of the lower failure rate on 
equilibrium demand is smaller than the negative effect caused by the price increase due to the higher share 
                                                             
1 ܸ ൌ ଶெమ൫ఛ෤భഇసబ൯
మ൫ସఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଶ଻൯
൫ଶఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଽ൯
మ൫ସఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଽ൯
 and ܸ ൌ ெమఛ෤భഇసబ
మ൫ఛ෤భഇసబ	–ଽ/ଶ൯
൫ଶఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଷ൯൫ఛ෤భഇసబ	–	ଷ൯
మ. 
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of Vm. Thus, in these cases, the total effect of an increasing share of Vm on equilibrium demand is negative. 
Figure 9 illustrates the response of equilibrium price and demand to changes in the composition of the 
variance of consumer ratings for ܸ ൏ ܸ in (a), ܸ ൑ ܸ ൑ ܸ in (b) and ܸ ൐ ܸ in (c). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Equilibrium Price and Demand for Hybrid Goods 
 
Through the mechanism described in proposition 6, equilibrium price and demand can increase with 
increasing total variance of product ratings. The shaded area in Figure 10 illustrates equilibrium demand 
for a product with an average rating of 4, ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ ൌ 1, a total variance of ratings between one and two, and 
varying relative shares of variance caused by mismatch costs and product failure. Note that, ceteris paribus, 
an increasing relative share of variance caused by mismatch costs always leads to an increase in equilibrium 
demand as for this combination of ܯ , ߬̃ଵఏୀ଴ , and ܸ , ܸ ൏ ܸ . Thus, the lower bound of the shaded area 
represents equilibrium demand for products with the lowest possible relative share of ௠ܸ while the upper 
bound represents equilibrium demand for products with the highest possible relative share of ௠ܸ. The point 
marked with A represents a product with a total variance of 1.1 with approximately 70% of this variance 
caused by mismatch costs and 30% by product failure. This combination results in an equilibrium price and 
demand of respectively 1.75 and 0.18. As equilibrium demand is increasing from bottom to top and the total 
variance is increasing from left to right, equilibrium demand for all products at the top right of A is higher 
than the demand for A even if the variance of ratings for these products is also higher than the variance of 
A. The solid black line in figure 10 represents all products with the same equilibrium price compared to the 
product marked in A ( ଶܲ∗ ൌ 1.75ሻ. Because the relative share of variance caused by mismatch costs increases 
from bottom to top, equilibrium price also increases in this line. Compared to the equilibrium price of A 
this results in higher prices for all products above the solid line. Thus, holding the average rating constant 
and increasing the total variance of ratings, we find higher equilibrium prices and higher equilibrium 
demand for products at the top right of A. Comparing the worst possible composition of variance, i.e., the 
lowest possible share of Vm, for a product with a total variance of one (the product marked with B (ܦଶ∗ ൌ0.17, ଶܲ∗ ൌ 1.71)) with the best possible composition of variance, i.e., the highest possible share of Vm, for a 
product with a total variance of two (marked with C (ܦଶ∗ ൌ 0.34, ଶܲ∗ ൌ 1.98)) shows that the product with 
twice the variance is 15% more expensive, and equilibrium demand doubles. This comparison illustrates 
that the effect of the variance of product ratings on product prices and sales substantially depends on the 
source of this variance. 
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Figure 10.  Equilibrium Demand for Products with Different Variance Compositions 
 
Conclusion 
The opportunity for online shopping significantly changed the way people purchase goods. Rating systems 
which enable consumers to observe the distribution of star ratings awarded by other consumers has 
contributed to this change. Naturally, a significant literature emerged which seeks to understand the effects 
of different aspects of these rating systems – such as number, average or variance – on product prices and 
consumer demand. Previous literature which analyzed the role of the variance of consumer ratings 
concentrated on ratings for products where the variance can be caused solely by informed search attributes. 
However, a high variance of consumer ratings may not be solely driven by such attributes but may also 
depend on experience attributes. Our work makes a first contribution towards filling this gap in the 
literature.  
We propose an analytical model where two product attributes may cause the variance of consumer ratings: 
a mismatch between consumer taste and the informed search attribute of a product, and the product's 
failure as experience attribute. We find that a higher variance caused by the informed search attribute 
indicates that a product is liked by some consumers and disliked by others, resulting in a higher equilibrium 
price and lower equilibrium demand. A higher variance caused by the experience attribute suggests an 
unreliable product and is therefore associated with a lower equilibrium price and lower equilibrium 
demand. Interestingly, holding the average rating as well as the total variance of ratings constant while 
increasing the share of the variance caused by the informed search attribute increases equilibrium prices 
and the demand for products with low variance. Thus counterintuitively, equilibrium price and demand are 
capable of increasing concomitant with a rise in the total variance of product ratings. Given the same 
average rating for two similar products, consumers may prefer the more expensive product with the higher 
total variance of ratings. Thus, our results suggest that considering informed search attributes and 
experience attributes as different sources of the variance of consumer ratings may be an important 
additional factor when assessing the effect of consumer ratings on product pricing and consumer demand. 
In addition to this result, our analytical model provides a theoretical foundation for the typically observed 
j-shaped distribution of consumer ratings in electronic commerce. 
Our findings have important managerial implications: First, if retailers were to consider the composition of 
the variance of consumer’s ratings they could improve their sales forecasts and increase profits by adjusting 
their stocks accordingly or by charging higher prices for those products for which a relatively larger share 
of the variance is caused by mismatch costs. Second, they could implement mechanisms to explicitly 
communicate information about the composition of the variance in order to enable more customers to 
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consider this important information in their decision making, which would further reduce information 
asymmetries in electronic commerce. Today, consumers can only indirectly infer this information by 
analyzing specific characteristics of the ratings distribution, i.e., a peak in 1-star ratings or by reading 
through the textual consumer reviews for a specific product. As a first step to making this information 
directly available, retailers may provide additional information on the percentage of the most negative 
consumer ratings caused by product failure. Retailers could collect this information by asking each 
consumer posting a negative rating whether it is based on product failure or on other taste specific factors.  
As with all research, the current study has limitations that present opportunities for future research. First, 
in our model the two consumer groups (first-period and second-period) are assumed to be distinct. Hence, 
consumers cannot exhibit strategic behavior. In reality, however, consumers may consider the timing of the 
purchase and, hence, the timing of the consumers purchase decision can be endogenized (e.g., Guo and 
Villas-Boas 2007, Sun 2012). Sun (2012) finds qualitatively the same results in the extension of her baseline 
model considering strategic behavior of consumers, but it remains to be analyzed whether this also holds 
for the model proposed in this article. Second, our results suggest that consumers and retailers would 
benefit from having information about the composition of the variance of product ratings, i.e. which 
proportion of the variance is caused by mismatch costs and which by product failure, although, this 
information is sometimes revealed by the textual reviews. However, products sometimes have too many 
consumer reviews that consumers and retailers have the ability to read all of them. To solve this issue, 
researchers should develop text mining approaches or semantic techniques (e.g., as in Archak et al. 2011) 
that can be used to identify the shares of variance caused by informed search and experience attributes. 
Finally, our model generates testable predictions regarding the effect of the variance of consumer ratings 
on product price and consumer demand. The sign of this effect depends to a large degree on the source of 
this variance. This provides an interesting direction for further research, especially for empirical and 
experimental investigations into the effects of the variance of consumer ratings which consider the different 
sources of variance, i.e. informed search and experience attributes.  
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